University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 49

Number 2

Article 2

2019

The Maryland Trust Act: The Fate of the Unknowledgeable
Beneficiary
Fred Franke
Franke, Sessions & Beckett, LLC.

Deb Howe
Franke, Sessions & Beckett, LLC.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Franke, Fred and Howe, Deb (2019) "The Maryland Trust Act: The Fate of the Unknowledgeable
Beneficiary," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 49 : No. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol49/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact hmorrell@ubalt.edu.

$57,&/(
7+(0$5</$1'75867$&77+()$7(2)7+(
81.12:/('*($%/(%(1(),&,$5<
%\)UHG)UDQNH 'HE+RZH 
When adopting its version of the Uniform Trust Code (the "UTC"), Maryland
made two modifications to the UTC that potentially reduced the ability of trust
beneficiaries to enforce their rights. First, the Maryland Trust Act ("MTA")
did not include the UTC requirement that a trustee shall keep beneficiaries
reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and of material facts
necessary to protect their interests regardless of whether the beneficiary
requests such information. Second, Maryland added to the “virtual
representation” provisions of the MTA that a settlor can designate a
representative regardless of the beneficiary's age or capacity to receive notice
and provide consent on behalf of the beneficiary. These provisions taken
together could significantly impair a beneficiary's ability to enforce a trust.
This article examines the implications of this shift away from a well-informed
beneficiary including whether it defeats the purpose of a trust, accomplishes
its stated goal, and whether these sections successfully abrogate the common
law.
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The express trust has a long history, with its earliest form arising in the 14th
century, and it "enjoyed a popularity at least from the reign of Edward III
(1327-1377)."1 English legal history scholar Frederic William Maitland
famously described the trust as "the most distinctive achievement of English
lawyers. It seems to us almost essential to civilization."2 The impetus behind
the UTC was the desire to clarify the common law as it had developed in a
scattershot fashion among various states:
The primary stimulus to the Commissioners' drafting of the
Uniform Trust Code is the greater use of trusts in recent years,
both in family estate planning and in commercial transactions,
*

Fred is the managing partner and Deb is an associate with Franke, Sessions & Beckett
LLC of Annapolis Maryland. The firm limits its practice to the law of estates and trusts
but within that niche handles planning, administration, and fiduciary litigation.
© Franke, Sessions & Beckett, LLC.
1
R.H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1503, 1503
(1979).
2
FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES, 23 (photo. reprint 1999)
(A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1st ed. 1909).
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both in the United States and internationally. This greater
use of the trust, and consequent rise in the number of dayto-day questions involving trusts, has led to a recognition
that the trust law in many states is thin … The Uniform
Trust Code will provide States with precise,
comprehensive, and easily accessible guidance on trust law
questions. …
Much of the Uniform Trust Code is a codification of
the common law of trusts.3
Although the purpose of the UTC was to set out a "precise, comprehensive,
and easily accessible guidance on trust law questions", neither the UTC
codification of the law of trusts nor the MTA was meant to supplant the
common law.
The common law of trusts and principles of equity supplement
this title, except to the extent modified by this title or another
statute of the state.4
Paying tribute to the continuing vitality of the common law and the court
of equity is an acknowledgement that the provisions of the UTC and the
Maryland Trust Code are to be understood within the context of traditional
trust law:
The common law of trusts is not static but includes the
contemporary and evolving rules of decision developed by the
courts in exercise of their power to adapt the law to new
situations and changing conditions. It also includes the
traditional and broad equitable jurisdiction of the court, which
the Code in no way restricts.5
By explicitly making the MTA operate within the broader framework of
the common law of trusts and equitable principles, the MTA is even less
susceptible to a reading that overturns the common law of trusts than other
statutory provisions under Maryland decisional law.6

3

UNIF. TRUST CODE Prefatory Note (amended 2010).
MD. CODE EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-106 (emphasis added); See also UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 106 (amended 2010).
5
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 106 cmt. (amended 2010).
6
See, Antonio v. SSA Sec., Inc., 442 Md. 67, 74 (2015) ("There is, however, one
important and particularly relevant interpretative principle reining-in our quest to
elucidate the will of the Legislature: We will not presume abrogation of the common
law unless the Legislature's intent to do so is clear. When the intent of the Legislature
is unclear with regard to abrogation, we will interpret the statute to be congruent with
the common law." (Internal quotation marks omitted)).
4
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"The duty to keep a beneficiary reasonably informed of the administration
of the trust is a fundamental duty of a trustee."7
A. An Informed Beneficiary is Fundamental to a Trust
At its core, a trust is structured around relationships—a trustee holds
property for a beneficiary.8 "A trust … is a fiduciary relationship with
respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title is held to
equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person
…"9 Without the ability of the beneficiary to enforce a trust, a trust does not
exist:
A [testator/settlor] who attempts to create a trust without any
accountability in the trustee is contradicting himself. A trust
necessarily grants rights to the beneficiary that are
enforceable in equity. If the trustee cannot be called to
account, the beneficiary cannot force the trustee to any
particular line of conduct with regard to the trust property or
sue for breach of trust. The trustee may do as he likes with the
property, and the beneficiary is without remedy. If the court
finds that the settlor really intended a trust, it would seem that
accountability in chancery or other court must inevitably
follow as an incident. Without an account the beneficiary
must be in the dark as to whether there has been a breach of
trust and so is prevented as a practical matter from holding the
trustee liable for the breach.10

7

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813 cmt. (amended 2010). See also UNIF. PROB. CODE § 7-303
(1969).
8
Maitland, supra note 2 (“I should define a trust in some such way as the following
—when a person has rights which he is bound to exercise on behalf of another or for
the accomplishment of some purpose he is said to have those rights in trust for that
other or for that other purpose and he is called a trustee.").
9
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 2 (1959).
10
George Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, § 973 at 467 (Rev. 2d Ed. 1983) (as
quoted in Jacob v. Davis, 128 Md. App. 433, 450 (1999)). See also David M. English,
The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L.
REV. 143, 201 (2002)("The duty to keep the beneficiaries reasonably informed of the
administration of the trust is a fundamental duty of a trustee, for only by being
informed can the beneficiaries know of and enforce their interests.").
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So fundamental is the duty of a trustee to supply sufficient information to
a beneficiary to assure protection of the beneficiary's rights, the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts states that:
Although the terms of the trust may regulate the amount of
information which the trustee must give and the frequency
with which it must be given, the beneficiary is always entitled
to such information as is reasonably necessary to enable him
to enforce his rights under the trust or to prevent or to redress
a breach of trust.11
The emphasis on a beneficiary's right to knowledge stems from the fact that
the beneficiary is the primary individual with standing to enforce a trust.12 As
a result, an informed beneficiary is necessary to the survival of a trust because
"[a]s a practical matter . . . beneficiaries who do not know of the trust's
existence, or of their interests in it, would be unable to hold the trustee
accountable."13 This fundamental principle of the common law of trusts was
articulated by an Ohio court in In re Searight's Estate. In that case, the Court
determined that a trust for the benefit of a dog could not be a valid trust because
"the absence of a beneficiary having a legal standing in court and capable of
demanding an accounting of the trustee is fatal and the trust fails . . ."14
The common law's focus on the beneficiary of the trust appears throughout
trust law. John Langbein, a Yale law professor with an expertise in trust and
estate law, notes that a trust must be for the beneficiary.
By refashioning the rule [against capricious purpose] to spell
out that a valid trust must benefit the beneficiaries, the Third
11

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. c (1959).
The importance of this right of enforcement is highlighted by the fact that charitable
trusts that do not have identifiable beneficiaries face serious enforcement problems.
Because many of these trusts do not have identifiable beneficiaries, attorneys general
are given the authority to enforce the trust, but they still have to be notified of a
violation and have the time and resources to pursue enforcement. See Holt v. College
of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 754 (1964)(citing Kenneth
L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility,
73 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1960)); George Gleason Bogert, Proposed Legislation
Regarding State Supervision of Charities, 52 MICH. L. REV. 633 (1954); George
Gleason Bogert, Recent Developments Regarding the Law of Charitable Donations
and Charitable Trusts, 5 HASTINGS L. J. 95 (1954). See also State Supervision of the
Administration of Charitable Trusts, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 659 (1947); The Charitable
Corporation, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1168 (1951)).
13
Bogert, et al., supra note 10, at 965.
14
In re Searight's Estate, 87 Ohio App. 417, 421 (1950) (citing Mannix v. Purcell, 46
Ohio St. 102 (1888)). The common law has been modified by statute to permit pet
trusts as a form of "honorary trusts," but unless a specific exception exist, a trust must
have a beneficiary. See generally Bogert, et al. supra note 10, at 166; MD. CODE ANN.
EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-407 (Trusts Created for the Care of Animals).

12
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Restatement and the Code articulate the policy that has been
at work in these cases. As the court said in Colonial Trust
Co. v. Brown[ , 105 Conn. 261 (Conn. 1926)], a trust must
advance "the interests of the beneficiaries of the trust."15
For these requirements to be met, however, the beneficiary must be
identifiable. In his treatise on the law of trusts and trustees, Bogert explains
that "[t]he settlor must select and identify the person or persons who are to be
the beneficiaries in order to create such a trust. There are few real or apparent
exceptions to this rule . . ."16
B. Settlors May Wish to Hide Trusts from the Beneficiaries
However central the beneficiary's right to information is to the efficacy of
a trust, some settlors may want to limit a beneficiary's knowledge of the trust
for his or her benefit:
The settlor may believe that knowledge of the trust may have
a harmful effect on the beneficiaries and that full disclosure
of the trust will cause the beneficiaries to grow up feeling
dependent, conflicted, or listless. The settlor may also fear
that full disclosure of the trust will cause the beneficiary to
challenge the trustee's authority. Some settlors worry that
knowledge of trust interests will “demotivate” beneficiaries
by “encouraging them to take up a life of ease rather than work
and be productive citizens."17
Upbringing, not secrecy about wealth or other advantages, is a more likely
antidote to the dreaded "trust-fund baby" syndrome. 18 In a survey of
15

John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U.L. REV. 1105,
1108 (2004).
16
Bogert, et al., supra note 10, at 161.
17
Kevin D. Millard, The Trustee's Duty to Inform and Report under the Uniform Trust
Code, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 373, 393 (2005) (Mr. Millard concludes that
states "ought not follow the path" taken by a few jurisdictions stripping out entirely
the date of a trustee to inform and report).
18
SAMMY HAGAR & THE CIRCLE, TRUST FUND BABY (BMG Rights Management (US)
LLC 2019); Trust Fund Baby, Sammy Hagar & The Circle,
https://www.songfacts.com/facts/sammy-hagar/trust-fund-baby (last visited Apr. 3,
2019). Sammy Hagar & the Circle in their song "Trust Fund Baby," describe a trust
fund baby as someone "hangin' with the Euro trash, getting into momma's stash [and]
headed for a social crash." Mr. Hagar does not approve of the lifestyle. Mr. Hagar
explained that his song describes "what happens when kids are given too much
money—to [sic] early in life—and it becomes an affliction. All the money in the world
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members of the California Fellows of the American College of Trust and
Estate Counsel about the effectiveness of estate planning as a means of
addressing concerns of irresponsible children, one Fellow wrote "[t]o my
clients whose children are disappointments, lazy, or indolent and fail to live
up to their potential I say that no device that I can draft will make up for
lessons that were not learned as a child."19
Parents mistakenly believe that what their children don't know
won't hurt them. They rationalize that they won't create
spoiled trust fund kids if their kids don’t know they have a
trust fund. The problem of course, is that they eventually will
discover they have one and will be confused and upset about
why their parents never informed them of it . . . Early on
(usually by adolescence) tell your kids about the trust fund
and explain that the trust has been established for them as a
responsible member of the family.20
Peter Buffett, an individual who had potentially a high risk of succumbing
to trust-fund baby syndrome, discussed his advice to wealthy parents in his
book Life is What you Make it: Finding your Own Path to Fulfillment. Instead
of recommending secret trusts, "[t]he son of billionaire investor Warren Buffet
has an old-world spiritual message for today's money rich parents: teach your
children values and do not give them everything they want."21
If values, morality and a developed sense of purpose are the keys to
productive, fulfilled beneficiaries, trust secrecy is, at best, tangential to
achieving those goals. In any event, settlors who may wish to keep
beneficiaries minimally informed of a trust and its administration cannot
entirely hide the existence of the trust from the beneficiaries under the
common law.22
isn't a guarantee for a good life. I'm a believer in working hard and finding purposeful
work . . ." .
19
Jon J. Gallo & James Grubman, The Use and Abuse of Incentive Trusts:
Improvements and Alternatives, 45 U. MIAMI HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN., ¶
1300 (2011).
20
Eileen Gallo & Jon Gallo, Silver Spoon Kids 199 (2002).
21
Christine Kearney, Warren Buffett's Son Preaches Values as Wealth, Reuters
Business News (May 10, 2010) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-books-buffettidUSTRE64935220100510; Stephanie Asymkos, How Billionaire Warren Buffet
Ended Up with 3 Totally Normal Kids (Peter Buffett's father Warren Buffet, agrees)
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/billionaire-warren-buffett-ended-3-185016428.html
(last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
22
Trusts can, however, be tailored to reflect and protect the settlor's values. "Properly
drafted trusts can encourage such goals as education, entrepreneurship, and
involvement in philanthropy. . . [M]ost children will not resent behavior-related
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Concerns about the trust fund baby syndrome are a primary impetus behind
the shift away from an informed beneficiary.
C. The UTC Codifies the Common Law Rule Regarding the Trustee's
Duty to Keep the Beneficiary Informed
The common law is not precise in delineating the exact nature of a trustee's
duty to keep the beneficiary adequately informed: "[i]nterestingly, as
fundamental as disclosure may be in trust administration, the duty to disclose
is not precisely defined at common law and is far from uniform."23 The UTC
sought to rectify this ambiguity and inconsistency by making certain
disclosures of information to beneficiaries a non-modifiable right.
These non-modifiable provisions are an exception to the general rule—
present at common law, in the UTC, and in the MTA—that the terms of the
trust24 govern all aspects of the trust. Included among the non-modifiable
provisions under the UTC are the duty to respond to a beneficiary's request for
information and the duty to notify a beneficiary who is twenty-five years old
or older of the existence of the trust, the identity of the trustee, and the
beneficiary's right to information.25
Section 813 of the UTC articulates the common law rule that beneficiaries
must be kept informed of the activity of the trust.26 Adding specificity to the
common law rule, the UTC lists the information that the trustee must provide
to the beneficiary at certain times, but permits the settlor to waive certain of
these disclosures.27 David English, the Reporter for the UTC, noted that "[t]he
clauses if the clauses reflect values that their parents communicated to them all." Gallo
& Gallo, supra note 20
23
Lauren Z. Curry, Agents in Secrecy: The Use of Information Surrogates in Trust
Administration, 64 VAND. L. REV. 925, 926 (2011).
24
The "terms of the trust" is a defined term meaning much more than the mere trust
document. "'Terms of a trust' means the manifestation of the intent of the settlor
regarding the provisions of a trust as expressed in the trust instrument or as may be
established by other evidence that would be admissible in a judicial proceeding" MD.
CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-103(z). See also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(18)
(amended 2010); Fred Franke & Anna Katherine Moody, The Terms of the Trust:
Extrinsic Evidence of Settlor Intent, 40 ACTEC L.J. 1 (2014).
25
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(8) & (9) (amended 2010). See also MD. CODE ANN. EST.
& TRUSTS § 14.5-105(10) & (11).
26
"Section 813 of the Code codifies this common law obligation, and, at the same time,
adds detail and makes application of the duty more precise." David M. English, The
Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV.
413, 199 (2002).
27
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813 (amended 2010); David M. English, The Uniform Trust
Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 413, 202
(2002) ("Most of the specific disclosure requirements are waivable. Not waivable is the
trustee's obligation to notify the qualified beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust
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most discussed issue during the drafting of the UTC and subsequent to its
approval is the extent to which a settlor may waive the above disclosure
requirements."28 The fact that certain specific types of notice—such as
notifying the beneficiary within 60 days of the acceptance of a trusteeship—
may be waived by the trust instrument does not necessarily mean that the
general duty to keep a beneficiary informed, an articulation of the common
law, may be waived.
The first sentence of UTC Section 813(a) is a general statement of a
trustee's affirmative duty to keep a beneficiary informed. In its entirety,
Section 813(a) states that:
A trustee shall keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust
reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and
of the material facts necessary for them to protect their
interests. Unless unreasonable under the circumstances, a
trustee shall promptly respond to a beneficiary’s request for
information related to the administration of the trust.
According to the first sentence of Section 813(a), the trustee is bound to
provide certain material information to the beneficiary regardless of whether
such a beneficiary makes a request. The Comment to UTC Section 813
characterizes this duty as "a fundamental duty of a trustee."29
The affirmative duty to notify a beneficiary, absent a request, of material
facts necessary for the beneficiary to enforce his or her rights is a restatement
of the common law.30 The Supreme Court of Delaware articulated the common
law rule in McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503 (2002). In that case, the Court
held that a trust beneficiary did not need to request information that was
necessary for him to enforce his rights. The trustee had a duty to provide that
information to the beneficiary absent a request. In that case, the settlor ("Henry
McNeil") created a trust that included his children and his wife as the current
beneficiaries. Henry McNeil, however, did not treat his children as current
beneficiaries of the trust. Also, one child, Hank McNeil ("Hank McNeil"), fell
into disfavor during the parents' lifetimes. Hank McNeil did not know he was
a current discretionary beneficiary of the trust. This was an "impression

who are age twenty-five or older of the existence of the trust, of the identity of the
trustee, and of the right to request trustee's reports.").
28
David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and
Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 413, 202 (2002).
29
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813 cmt. (amended 2010).
30
See McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 506 (2002); Rafert v. Meyer, 290 Neb. 219,
224 (2015); Trostle v. Trostle, 77 S.W.3d 908, 914 (2002) (citing Huie v. DeShazo,
922 S.w.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996)).
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apparently fostered by [Henry McNeil]"31 and maintained by the trustees.32 In
other words, the trustees knew that the beneficiary had a misconception
regarding his rights under the trust, and did not correct that misconception.
Eventually, Hank McNeil brought an action against the trustees after his
parents' deaths to demand a makeup provision for distribution he claimed
should have been made all along. The court held that "even in the absence of
a request for information, a trustee must communicate essential facts, such as
the existence of the basic terms of the trust. That a person is current beneficiary
of the trust is indeed an essential fact."33
The common law duty articulated by the Court in McNeil is the affirmative
duty to inform a beneficiary of facts necessary to enforce the beneficiary's
rights. It is the same duty articulated in the first sentence of UTC Section
813(a). The Court in McNeil found that duty existed despite the fact that the
trust in that case gave the trustees "extraordinarily broad authority to manage
the trusts."34
,,,

6(&7,212)7+(07$20,76$.(<6(17(1&(
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The MTA omits the first sentence of Section 813(a) of the UTC. The
MTA's version of Section 813 as compared to the UTC's is represented as
follows with the portion of the UTC omitted by the MTA struck through and
the additions to the UTC underlined:
A trustee shall keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust
reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and
of the material facts necessary for them to protect their
interests. Unless unreasonable under the circumstances, a
trustee shall promptly respond to the request of a qualified
beneficiary’s request for information related to the
administration of the trust, including a copy of the trust
instrument.
It is not clear that the omission indicates an intention to abrogate the
common law rule. When interpreting a statute by examining the statute's
Legislative history, the court views amendments that were considered and/or
enacted as the statute passed through the Legislature and the statute's
relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation as an external manifestation
31

McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 506 (2002).
Id. at 507.
33
Id. at 510.
34
Id. at 508.
32
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and/or persuasive evidence of Legislative purpose. 35 Here, however, there is
no indication that the Bill ever included the first sentence of Section 813(a) as
it passed through the Legislature. The first draft of the MTA was introduced
on November 13, 2013 and did not include the first sentence of Section
813(a).36 Thus there is no indication that the legislature ever considered that
provision or ever knew that it was a provision in UTC Section 813.
A. The MTA's Omission does not Abrogate the Common Law Duty
Setting aside the history and intention behind the omission, the fact remains
that the MTA does not include the first sentence of UTC Section 813(a). Given
the fact that the creation of a trust presupposes that a beneficiary may enforce
its terms, it is doubtful a waiver by the settlor of the affirmative duty to inform
a beneficiary of material facts relevant to that beneficiary's situation would be
effective:
[T]he UTC does not attempt to codify every aspect of trust
law, and specifically provides that the common law of trusts
and principles of equity supplement the UTC. Therefore, a
purported waiver by a settlor of any aspect of the duty to
inform and report is subject to the common law principle that
a beneficiary is always entitled to information about the trust
that is reasonably necessary to allow the beneficiary to
enforce the trust.37
Given the primacy of a beneficiary's enforcement ability coupled with the
MTA Section 14.5-106 (Common Law of Trusts and Principles of Equity), the
omission of a sentence present in the UTC version of Section 813(a) is not a
clear manifestation of intent to abrogate the common law.38

35

SVF Riva Annapolis LLC, et al. v. Gilroy, 459 Md. 632, 647, 696 (2018).
H.B. 83, 2014 Leg., 434th Sess. (Md. 2014).
37
Millard supra note 17, at 383 (citing Briggs v. Crowley, 224 N.E. 2d 417, 421 (Mass.
1967)In Re Estate of Lang, 302 N.Y.S. 2d 954, 957 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1969) (entitling
beneficiaries of testamentary trusts to accounting; in terrorem clause in will purporting
to negate benefits for any beneficiary request of the administration of the trust held
void as against public policy); Hollenbeck v. Hanna, 802 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. App.
1991); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173, cmt. c (1959) (Regardless of terms
of the trust purporting to limit information to be given to the beneficiary, "the
beneficiary is always entitled to such information as is reasonably necessary to enable
him to enforce the rights under the trust or to prevent or redress a breach of trust."));
See also supra Part II(C).
38
See also supra note 6.
36
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B. Limitation on Ability to Enforce
If MTA Section 813 were read to abrogate the trustee's common law duty
to affirmatively keep the beneficiary reasonably informed about the
administration of the trust and material facts necessary to enforce the
beneficiary's rights, that departure from the common law would pose a danger
to the institution of the trust.
Without this core duty, the trustee's duty can be reduced to (1) responding
to a beneficiary's requests for information,39 (2) notifying a beneficiary of its
acceptance of a trusteeship,40 and (3) notifying a beneficiary of the existence
of a trust, identify of the settlor, right to request a copy of the trust, and right
to a trustee report.41
In other words, the onus is on the beneficiary to seek out information
regarding the trust. To be effective, the beneficiary must ask the correct
question at the correct time to discover information that could show a breach
of trust.
,9

6(&7,212)7+(07$3(50,76$6(77/2572
'(6,*1$7($5(35(6(17$7,9(725(&(,9(127,&(
21%(+$/)2)$%(1(),&,$5<

Representation of a beneficiary's interest is not a new concept in the world
of trusts. The difficulties of achieving notice and obtaining consent when
beneficiaries are minor, unborn, incompetent, or otherwise unavailable has
made representation a necessary provision of trust codes. 42 The MTA Section
306, however, is not a provision meant to alleviate the issue of obtaining
consent or effectuating notice on unavailable beneficiaries.43 Instead, it is a
provision that permits a settlor to name a representative for a beneficiary
regardless of the beneficiary's age, competence, or availability.
A. Representation Under the UTC
Article 3 of the UTC addresses two types of representation: fiduciary and
virtual.44 The holder of a testamentary power of appointment may represent
and bind a beneficiary,45 a fiduciary or parent may represent and bind a
39

MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-813(a) (2017).
Id. § 14.5-813(b)(1)(i) (2017).
41
Id. § 14.5-813(b)(1)(ii) (2017).
42
English, supra note 28, at 158 (noting that "achieving notice to or the consent of all
of the beneficiaries is frequently difficult.").
43
MTA Section 306 is codified at MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-306 (2017).
44
See UNIF. TRUST CODE Art. 3, general cmt. (amended 2010).
45
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 302 (amended
40
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beneficiary,46 a person with "substantially identical interests" may represent
and bind a minor, disabled person, unborn person, or person whose identity or
location is unknown,47 a court-appointed representative may represent and bind
a beneficiary.48
Each of the UTC's representation provisions is limited in some way. A
representative who is not court-appointed is prohibited from acting when there
is a conflict of interest. Under Section 302 (interest subject to power of
appointment) the interest represented is subject to divestment via exercise of a
power of appointment. Under Section 303 (fiduciary or parent), the
representatives are bound by existing fiduciary standards. Under Section 304
(representation by person with substantially identical interests) the
representative is, by definition, personally invested in the outcome. A court
appointed representative under Section 305 must answer to the court for any
action (or inaction) he or she undertakes. Finally, each of these provisions
except the last one is limited by the phrase "only to the extent there is no
conflict of interest between the representative and the person represented."49
The restricted scenarios where representation is permitted under the UTC
highlights the emphasis that the UTC places on a beneficiary's involvement
with and knowledge of a trust. Where representation is permitted, the UTC
structures the representation in such a way that the interests being represented
are securely protected.
B. Summary of Maryland's Section 306
Section 306 of the MTA50 permits a settlor to designate an individual to
serve as a beneficiary's representative. Section 301 of the MTA explains that
46

See id. § 303.
See id. § 304.
48
See id. § 305.
49
See id. §§ 302–04.
50
In its entirety, MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-306 states as follows:
(a) A settlor may:
(1) Designate one or more persons who may serve
as a representative or successor representative of
a beneficiary of the trust;
(2) Designate one or more other persons who may
designate a representative or successor
representative of a beneficiary of the trust; and
(3) Specify the order of priority among two or
more persons who are authorized under this title
to serve as a representative or successor
representative of a beneficiary of the trust.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, except
as provided in § 14.5-303 of this subtitle, a person
47
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notice to a representative "has the same effect as if notice were given directly
to the other person . . ."51 A representative may not also be trustee of the trust
unless it is pursuant to Section 303 (addressing the representation of minor or
disabled persons).52 A representative serving under Section 306 is only liable
for acts committed in bad faith.53 Although the MTA was adopted in 2014,
Section 306 was not adopted until 2017.
Section 301 permits some potential check on representation because a
beneficiary can object to the representative. Notice given by a trustee to a
representative will not be effective if served on a representative after the
beneficiary has notified both the trustee and the representative of his or her
objection.54 Similarly, a representative's consent is not binding on the
beneficiary if the beneficiary notifies both the representative and trustee of his
or her objection before the consent would have become binding.55
designated under subsection (a) of this section may not
serve as a representative of a beneficiary of a trust if the
person serves as a trustee of the same trust.
(c)
(1) A representative designated under subsection
(a) of this section may be held liable to the
beneficiary on whose behalf the representative
acts only if:
(i) The representative has undertaken or
agreed to represent the beneficiary; and
(ii) Subject to paragraph (2) of this
subsection, the representative's action or
failure to act is proven by clear and
convincing evidence to have been in bad
faith with respect to the beneficiary.
(2) For purposes of determining liability under
paragraph (1)(ii) of this subsection, a
representative acts, or fails to act, in bad faith only
if:
(i) The action or inaction was the result
of intentional wrongdoing by the
representative; or
(ii) The representative acted, or failed to
act, with reckless indifference to the
purposes of the trust or the interests of
the beneficiary on whose behalf the
representative acted.
51
MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-301(a) (2017).
52
Id. §§ 14.5-306(b) & 303 (2017).
53
Id. § 14.5-306(c) (2017).
54
Id. § 14.5-301(a).
55
Id. § 14.5-301(b).
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C. Effect on Beneficiary's Ability to Enforce a Trust
Section 306 of the MTA limits a beneficiary's ability to protect his or her
rights under a trust. The most obvious way that this limitation occurs is by
diverting relevant information away from the beneficiary. Maine has a statute
similar to Section 306 that permits a settlor to designate a representative for a
beneficiary. A comment to Maine's statute states that the section was included
"as a means to provide settlors with an option to prevent disclosure of the
existence of the trust and details of the trust administration to qualified
beneficiaries."56 As detailed supra in Section II(A), knowledge of the existence
of the trust and details regarding its administration are a prerequisite to a
beneficiary's ability to enforce his or her rights under the trust.57
In addition to a beneficiary's alarming lack of enforcement ability, even if
a beneficiary takes affirmative action to object to the representative—as
provided in Section 301—and discovers information about a breach of trust,
the additional time spent in uncovering the issue may mean that the beneficiary
is barred by the statute of limitations. As Alan Newman noted, if a
. . . trustee does not inform and report to a beneficiary about
the trust, there is a significant possibility that the jurisdiction's
version of [UTC's] section 1005(c) [setting the statute of
limitations applicable to actions against a trustee] will bar a
beneficiary's claim against the trustee for breach without the
beneficiary having sufficient information about the trust, the
beneficiary's interest in it, and the claim to protect his or her
interest in the trust.58
The MTA's Section 904 sets a limitation of one year on a trustee's liability
for a breach of trust. The limitation time begins from when "the beneficiary or
the representative of the beneficiary is sent a report that adequately discloses
the existence of a potential claim for breach of trust and informs the
56

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 105 cmt.
A broad representation provision such as the Maryland Trust Act's § 306 is the
exception - While most states have representation provisions similar to the UTC's or
no representation provisions at all, some states including Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Maine, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania, have adopted provisions
similar to Maryland's regarding a settlor's ability to appoint a representative for a
beneficiary. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-487a–f; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 3339; FLA.
STAT. § 736.0306; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B § 105; MO. REV. STAT. § 456.1-105 (3);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5801.04; OR. REV. STAT. § 130.020; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §
7780.3(k).
58
Alan Newman, You Don't Know What You've Got till It's Gone: The Time-Barred
Claims Under the Uniform Trust Code, 48 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L. J. 459, 479–480
(2014).
57
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beneficiary or the representative of the beneficiary of the time allowed for
bringing a judicial action"59
Because the statute of limitations begins running when either the
representative or the beneficiary receives the relevant notice, even a diligent
beneficiary may be unable to enforce his or her rights.
A trust will not be as closely monitored by a representative as it would be
by a beneficiary. This limitation on a beneficiary's ability to enforce his or her
rights exists even if the representative is well-intentioned. While a beneficiary
is motivated to enforce his or her rights, a representative who stands to gain
nothing personally and has limited liability—as discussed infra at Part
IV(D)—will be less diligent in monitoring the trust. "[I]t is only the
beneficiaries of the trust who truly have an incentive to supervise the activities
of the trustee and thus shifting the supervisory responsibility to others only
begs the question of when would those 'others' have the duty to inform the
beneficiaries."60 This is true of the best-intentioned, diligent representative and
only becomes more of a concern with less exemplary individuals.
Even more concerning to a beneficiary's ability to monitor a trust is the
development of the non-judicial settlement agreement. A notable achievement
of the UTC was the codification of non-judicial settlement agreements and,
indeed, guidelines for what may constitute permissible judicial settlement
agreements modifying the terms as expressed in the trust agreement. These
provisions, however, coupled with the representation provisions, permit a
trustee and the representative to modify the trust without ever consulting with
or notifying the beneficiary.
D. Sequestering of the Fiduciary Duty
The trustee of a trust is held to a high fiduciary standard that requires it to
put the interests of the beneficiary as its highest priority.61 It is such a
fundamental duty in the context of a trust that all fiduciaries are bound by it.
Further, the loyalty rule applies to all fiduciaries and not
merely to trustees, although as applied to some fiduciaries the
duty is to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries rather
59

MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-904(a).
Turney P. Berry, The Whether, Why, Whom, What, and When of the Trustee's Duty
to Notify Beneficiaries, 45 U. MIAMI HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON EST. PLANNING ¶
1450 (2011 U. of Miami).
61
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 cmt. (amended 2010) (describing the duty of loyalty as
"perhaps the most fundamental duty of the trustee");(the UTC's focus on loyalty to the
beneficiary is not unique. It is a restatement of the common law); Bogert, et al., supra
note 10, at 543 ("These rules derive from the common law and for the most part follow
it. Section 802(a) states the basic rule, that a trustee shall administer the trust solely in
the interests of the beneficiaries.").
60
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than in their sole interests. The duty of loyalty applies
to agents, attorneys, executors and administrators, guardians
and conservators, officers and directors of corporations,
trustees in bankruptcy, receivers in receiverships,
ERISA plan fiduciaries, joint ventures, and others
representing persons who justifiably place trust and
confidence in the representatives with regard to the
management of business affairs. Loyalty is also required
from that rather indefinite group who occupy a
“confidential relation” and de facto have a high degree of
control over the affairs of persons who are in an inferior
position.62
A representative under MTA Section 306, however, is not a fiduciary. A
representative is held to the far lower standard that he or she not act in bad
faith.63 Florida has a representation statute that is very similar to Section 306.
In discussing that section, Cindy Basham writes that, "[a] designated
representative is not a fiduciary and is not liable to the beneficiary
whose interests are represented or to anyone claiming through that beneficiary
for actions taken or omissions to act made in good faith."64 Bashman also
makes the interesting observation that the liability standard relating to the
representative under Florida law can be modified by the terms of a trust.65
Similarly, the MTA's Section 105 does not prohibit a settlor from modifying
the liability standard applicable to a representative under Section 306(c).
Effectively, the representative acts as a buffer to the fiduciary duty. Before
the representation provision, a beneficiary could wield the hefty sword of
fiduciary duty to protect him or herself against wrongs done by the trustee.
With a representative in place, the beneficiary's arsenal is reduced to the
measly dagger of the bad faith standard. If a trustee provides information to a
representative that discloses a breach of trust, and the representative takes no
action within the relevant period, the beneficiary has no claim against the
trustee.66 The beneficiary's recourse would be to bring a claim against the
representative claiming that the representative breached his or her duty.
While the representative's duty is identified as a good faith standard, MTA
Section 306 further limits this standard so that it is even lower than a contract
62

Bogert, et al., supra note 10.
MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-306(c) (2017).
64
Cindy Basham, Shedding Light on Keeping Beneficiaries in the Dark, 89 FLA. BAR
J. 94, 95 (2015).
65
Id. ("Furthermore, it is unclear whether the default and mandatory rules of F.S.
§736.0105 allow a settlor to remove the good-faith requirement to which a designated
representative is held. In any event, however, doing so may leave the beneficiary
with little recourse.").
66
See MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS §§ 14.5-301; 904(a) (2017).
63
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standard of good faith. According to MTA Section 306(c), the beneficiary
would have to show by clear and convincing evidence that the representative's
action or inaction was the result of his or her intentional wrongdoing or that it
was the result of reckless indifference to the purpose of the trust or the interests
of the beneficiary.67
The representative's duty to not intentionally act wrongly or act with
reckless indifference is a far cry from Justice Cardozo's description of the
fiduciary duty.
Not honestly alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of
equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided
loyalty by the ‘disintegrating erosion’ of particular
exceptions.68
The representative provision of Section 306 has buffered the fiduciary duty
such that, in reality, a beneficiary may well be left with nothing but the conduct
at a level no higher than "that trodden by the crowd."69
9

&21&/86,21

Trust law has developed with the beneficiary at its center requiring the
trustee to serve with utmost loyalty to the beneficiary's interest.70 Stepping
away from that long history to minimize the information a beneficiary must
receive and buffering the trustee from claims by the beneficiary poses a danger
to the entire fabric of "the most distinctive achievement" of the common law.

67

MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-306(c) (2017).
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 4694 (1928).
69
Id.
70
Bogert, et al., supra note 10.
68

